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made a part of the record. Therefore, a complete copy of the jury 
instructions, as given, has been attached hereto as Addendum 
Number 1. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR APPEAL 
Appellant seeks relief from the May 6, 1986 sentencing order 
on the grounds that the trial court improperly instructed the 
jury. Appellant has also instructed the undersigned to seek 
relief from the said order on the grounds that (1) the evidence 
was insufficient as a matter of law, and (2) that the trial court 
had no authority to require him to reimburse Sevier County for 
the attorney's fees it paid to defendant's trial counsel. 
At the same time that defendant was charged with the offense 
referred to in this appeal, he was also charged with another, 
separate, drug-related crime. Defendant petitioned this Court for 
leave to file an interlocutory appeal in that matter. That 
petition was ultimately denied (Utah Supreme Court case number 
860129), and, the State has elected not to pursue that charge. 
That matter is not before this Court and should not be confused 
with the issues raised in this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The undersigned did not act as appellant's trial counsel. A 
careful review of the transcript of the trial proceedings shows 
the following facts. 
Two sheriff's deputies met with an undercover agent. The 
agent was searched, wired for sound and given money. (T.48). The 
transmitting device was tested and found to be working properly. 
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(T.51). The agent went to defendant's home where he encountered 
defendant and others. (T.49,71). The officers were acquainted 
with defendant from prior contacts. (T.50,64). They recognized 
defendant's voice as they listened over their listening equipment 
from a nearby location. (T.50,67). The officers could not see 
what was happening. (T.56,70,75). 
The agent engaged defendant in a conversation ' about 
marijuana, during which price and quantity were discussed. (T.54-
55,67). Neither officer could remember exactly what was said. 
(T.55,68). According to what the officers overheard, a deal was 
struck. (T.49,67). Shortly thereafter, the agent met with the 
officers at a nearby location and delivered to them a baggie of 
marijuana and the balance of their money. (T.49). 
The officers made a tape recording of the conversation 
between the agent and defendant, but the tape was later ruined. 
(T.59). A partial transcript of the tape was available at trial. 
(T.60,62). 
A witness present at defendant's home at the time was called 
to testify. (T.79). He offered conflicting accounts of the events 
of that day. (T.79,85). He had made a prior inconsistent 
statement. (T.8 4). 
The undercover agent, Doug James, did not appear at the 
trial. The substance delivered by the agent to the officers was, 
in fact, marijuana. (T.78). 
The trial court instructed the jury, giving, inter alia, 
instruction number 22, to-wit: 
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Every person acting with the mental state 
required for the commission of an offense 
who directly commits the offense, who 
solicits, requests, commands, encourages, 
or intentionally aids another person to 
engage in conduct, which constitutes an 
offense shall be criminally liable as a 
party for such conduct. (A copy of this 
instruction is found in Addendum Number 
1.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The undersigned believes that the first error cissigned by 
the appellant, i.e., that the jury was improperly instructed, is 
a valid, appealable issue as to which a genuine legal argument 
exists. However, there appears to be nothing in the record to 
support the remaining points raised by the defendant, i.e., 
insufficiency of the evidence and lack of jurisdiction to order 
reimbursement for attorney's fees. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: THE TRIAL COURT'S INSTRUCTION NUMBER 22 WAS 
IMPROPER. 
The trial court's instruction number 22 is a verbatim quote 
of § 76-2-202, U.C.A., 1953, as amended. The State cannot utilize 
law from the Utah Criminal Code (Title 76) in a prosecution under 
the Utah Controlled Substances Act (Title 58, chapter 37). 
When there is a conflict between Title 76 and Title 58, the 
court is required to follow Title 58. 
" . . . [W]henever the requirements 
prescribed, the offenses defined or the 
penalties imposed relating to substances 
controlled by this act shall be or appear to 
be in conflict with . . . any other laws of 
this state, the provisions of this act shall 
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be controlling." § 58-37-19, U.C.A., 1953 as 
amended (emphasis added). 
The above-quoted section (58-37-19) was cited by this Court 
as controlling in the case of State v. Hicken, 659 P,2d 1038 
(Utah, 1983), a case in which the facts were extremely similar to 
those in the instant matter. In that case, the defendant was 
charged with distribution of a controlled substance for value, in 
contravention of § 58-37-8(1)(a)(ii), U.C.A., 1953 as amended, 
the same statute as the one used by the State herein. The trial 
court found that defendant should have been charged with 
arranging the sale of marijuana, as defined by § 58-37-
8(1)(a)(iv), and granted defendant's motion to dismiss. The state 
argued that defendant was properly charged with distribution for 
value since he would be guilty of that offense under § 76-2-202 
if he solicited, requested, commanded, encouraged or 
intentionally aided another person to engage in that criminal 
conduct. 
In the Hicken case, this Court affirmed the lower court's 
dismissal of the distributing charge, citing the following 
statutes: 
"The provisions of this code shall govern the 
construction of, the punishment for, and 
defenses against any offense defined in this 
court, or, except where otherwise 
specifically provided or the context 
otherwise requiresf any offense defined 
outside this code; provided such offense was 
committed after the effective date of this 
code." State v. Hicken, supra, at 1039, 
quoting § 76-1-103(1), U.C.A., 1953 as 
amended (emphasis the Court's). 
"It is the purpose of this act to regulate 
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and control the substances designated within 
section 58-37-4, and whenever the 
requirements prescribed, the offenses defined 
or the penalties imposed relating to 
substances controlled by this act shall be or 
appear to be in conflict with . . . any other 
laws of this state, the provisions of this 
act shall be controlling." Id., quoting § 58-
37-19, U.C.A., 1953 as amended (emphasis the 
Court's). 
In this case, the evidence, viewed in the light most 
favorable to the jury's verdict, is susceptible of only two 
different interpretations, i.e., either that defendant sold 
marijuana to the agent or that defendant arranged for someone 
else to sell to the agent. Under either interpretation, such 
conduct is prohibited by Chapter 37 of Title 58, U.C.A., 1953 as 
amended. Selling marijuana is prohibited by § 58-37-8(1)(a)(ii) 
(the statute under which defendant was charged). Arranging for 
the sale of marijuana is prohibited by § 58-37-8(1) (a) (iv) . 
The State may freely amend its information, even up to the 
time of the verdict. § 77-35-4 (d), U.C.A., 1953 as amended. 
Nevertheless, the State did not even request an amendment to the 
information to make it conform to the evidence. Rather, the State 
elected to proceed on the distributing charge and resorted to law 
from Title 76 (the accomplice section) to buttress its evidence. 
The State should not have been allowed to use law from outside 
Title 58 in presenting its case to the jury* 
POINT II: THE EVIDENCE AGAINST DEFENDANT WAS INSUFFICIENT, 
AS A MATTER OF LAW, TO SUSTAIN THE JURY VERDICT. 
State v. Frame, P. 2d , 39 Utah Adv. Rep. 12 (July 
31, 1986). State v. Espinoza, P.2d , 39 Utah Adv. Rep. 
23 (August 4, 1986). State v. Schreuder, 
Utah Adv. Rep. 46 (August 15, 1986). 
P.2d , 39 
POINT III: THE COURT BELOW HAD NO AUTHORITY TO ORDER 
APPELLANT TO REIMBURSE SEVTER COUNTY FOR THE FEES PAID TO TRIAL 
COUNSEL. 
§§ 77-32a-l, et seq., U.C.A., 1953 as amended. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant's conviction should be reversed and the matter 
remanded to the District Court for a new trial. 
Dated thxs day of August, 1986. 
l^J^Jl c/jQgj&*x^ 
David L. Mower 
Jackson, Mclff & Mower 
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ADDENDUM NUMBER 1 
v^  
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SEVIER COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
LEONARD SCOTT, 
Defendant, 
JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
CRIMINAL #941 
TO THE MEMBERS OF THE JURY: 
INSTRUCTION jl 
It is the duty of this Court to instruct you now concerning 
the law which applies to this case. It is your duty as jurors to 
follow the law as I shall state it to you. 
The jury's function is to decide issues of fact presented 
by the Information and the Defendant's plea of "Not Guilty11. You 
should not be influenced by pity for the Defendant or by prejudice 
against him. The fact that the Defendant has been arrested or sum-
moned for this offense or that an Information has been filed against 
him or that he has been brought before this Court to stand trial, 
should not be considered by you. None of these is evidence of his 
guilt. 
You are to be governed only by the evidence introduced 
in this trial and the law which I will state to you. You are expect-
ed to act conscientiously and calmly in weighing the evidence and 
applying the law of the case to reach a just verdict, regardless 
of what the consequences of such verdict may be. 
NO. 2 - EVIDENCE AND STIPULATIONS 
You are the exclusive judges of the facts, but you must 
determine the facts upon the evidence produced here in Court. If 
any evidence was ordered by me to be stricken, you must disregard 
it entirely. Neither should you speculate as to reasons for objec-
tions or the Court's ruling on them. 
Any statement made by either counsel should not be regard-
ed as evidence. However, if counsel for both parties have stipulated 
to any fact, you should regard that fact as being conclusively proved. 
NO. 3 - CONDUCT OF JURORS 
Your verdict must express the individual opinion of each 
juror. When you have reached a conclusion as to guilt or innocence 
of the Defendant, you should not change it merely because other 
jurors may disagree with you. Discuss your differences with an 
open mind, and if you are satisfied your first conclusion was wrong, 
do not hesitate to change it. Remember that you are not partisans 
or advocates, but rather judges. 
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NO. A - RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF INSTRUCTIONS 
The order in which these instructions are given has no 
significance as to their relative importance and you should not 
single out any part and ignore the rest. Consider the instructions 
as a whole. 
NO. 5 - WEIGHING EVIDENCE 
When there is a conflict in the evidence, you should 
reconcile such conflict if you reasonably can; but where the con-
flict cannot be reconciled, you must determine from the evidence 
what the true facts are. 
You are not bound to believe a witness unless his testi-
mony is reasonable in view of all the facts. You may believe one 
witness against many or many witnesses against a few, in accordance 
with your honest convictions. 
NO. 6 - CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES 
In judging the credibility of any witness, you should 
consider his possible bias, his possible interest in the result of 
the trial, and any possible motive he may have to testify as he 
does. You may consider his appearance on the witness stand, the 
reasonableness of his statements, his opportunity to know, his 
ability to understand and his capacity to remember. You should also 
consider whether the witness contradicted himself, or was contra-
dicted by other evidence. From all of this you should determine his 
credibility and what weight you should give his testimony. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 7 
You must not consider as evidence, any statement of counsel made 
during this trial; however, if counsel for the parties stipulate you will 
regard that fact as being conclusively proved. 
As to any question to which an objection was sustained, you must 
not speculate as to what the answer might have been or as to the reason for 
the objection. 
You must not consider any evidence that was rejected or any evidence 
that was stricken. 
A question is not evidence, and may be considered only as it supplies 
meaning to the answer. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 8 
You are not to decide an issue by the simple process of counting the 
number of witnesses that testified on the opposing sides. The final test is 
not the number of witnesses but in the convincing force of the evidence. 
INSTRUCTION NO. Q 
If, during this trial, 1 say or do anything which suggests to you 
that I favor the position of either party, don't be influenced by such 
suggestion. 
I do not intend to indicate any opinion as to which party should 
prevail. You are the exclusive judge of the facts. 
INSTRUCTION NUMBER 10 
The Defendant, Leonard Scott, is accused by an Information filed in 
this Court by the County Attorney of Sevier County, Utah, of having committed 
the crime of Distribution For Value of a Controlled Substance in contravention 
of Utah statutes. 
The essential allegations to the Information are as follows: 
That the Defendant, contrary to Sections 58-37-8(1)(a)(ii), Utah Code 
Annotated, on the 15th day of February, 1985, at or near Aurora, Sevier County, 
Utah, did knowingly and intentionally distribute for value a controlled 
substance, to-wit: marijuana. 
INSTRUCTION NUMBER H 
Before you can convict the Defendant of distribution for value of a 
controlled substance as set forth in the Information, you must find, from the 
evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, all of the following elements of that crime: 
(1) That on or about the 17th day of February, 1985, at or near 
Aurora, Sevier County, State of Utah, said Defendant did knowingly and 
intentionally distribute a controlled substance, and 
(2) That such distribution was made for value, and 
(3) That the substance was marijuana. 
"Distribute for Value" means to deliver a controlled substance in 
exchange for compensation, consideration, or item of value, or a promise 
therefor. 
If, after weighing all the available evidence, you are satisfied that 
all the above elements have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, then you 
should find the Defendant guilty. If, however, you are not so satisfied, you 
must find the Defendant not guilty. 
INSTRUCTION NUMBER 12 
A person engages in conduct intentional]y, or with intent or willfully 
with respect to the nature of his conduct or to a result of his conduct, when 
it is his conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct or cause the 
result. 
A person engages in conduct knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect 
to his conduct or to circumstances surrounding his conduct when he is aware of 
the nature of his conduct or the existing circumstance?. A person acts 
knowingly, or with knowledge with respect to a result of his conduct when he 
is aware that his conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result. 
INSTRUCTION NUMBER 13 
You must not suffer yourselves to be biased against the Defendant 
because of the fact that he has been arrested for this offense, or because 
an Information has been filed against him, or because he has been brought 
before the Court to stand trial. None of these facts are evidence* of his 
guilt, and you are not permitted to infer or to speculate from any or all of 
them that he is more likely to be guilty than innocent. 
INSTRUCTION NUMBER 14 
The law forbids you to be governed by mere sentiment, conjecture, 
sympathy, passion, prejudice, public opinion or public feeling. Both the 
State of Utah and the Defendant have a right to demand and they do demand and 
expect that you will conscientiously and dispassionately consider and weigh 
the evidence and apply the law of the case, and that you will reach a just 
verdict regardless of what the consequences of such verdict may be. 
INSTRUCTION NUMBER 15 
The law provides that a person who 5s charged with a crime is presumed 
to be innocent until proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The presumption 
of innocence is not a mere form to be disregarded by the jury at pleasure, but 
it is a substantial and essential part of the law and is binding upon the 
jury. The presumption of innocence follows the Defendant throughout the 
trial. This presumption is a humane provision of the law, intended so far 
as human agency is capable, to guard against the danger of an innocent person 
being unjustly punished. 
INSTRUCTION NUMBER 16 
Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is that degree of proof that satisfies 
the mind and convinces the understanding of those who are bound to act 
conscientiously upon it. It must arise from the evidence or the lack of 
evidence in the case. 
Iff after an impartial consideration and comparison of all the 
evidence, you can honestly say that you are not satisfied of a Defendant's 
guilt, you have a reasonable doubt; but if after such impartial consideration 
and comparison of all the evidence, you can truthfully say that you have an 
abiding conviction of each Defendant's guilt such as you would be willing to 
act upon in the more weighty and important matters relating to your own 
affairs, you have no reasonable doubt. 
The law does not require demonstration of that degree of proof which, 
excluding all possibility of error, produces absolute certainty, for such 
degree of proof is rarely possible. Only that degree of proof is necessary 
which convinces the mind and directs and satisfies the conscience of those 
who are bound to act conscientiously upon-it. 
INSTRUCTION NUMBER 16A 
It is your duty as jurors to consult with one another and to 
deliberate, with a view to reaching an agreement, if you can do so without 
violence to your individual judgment. You must decide the case for yourself, 
but should do so only after a consideration of the case with your fellow 
jurors. You should not hesitate to change an opinion when convinced that it is 
erroneous. However, you should not surrender your honest convictions 
concerning the effect or weight of evidence for the mere purpose of returning 
a verdict or solely because of the opinions of the other jurors. 
INSTRUCTION NUMBER 17 
The attitude and conduct of the jurors at the outset of their 
deliberations are a matter of considerable importance. It is rarely productive 
or good for a juror, upon entering the jury room, to m&ke an emphatic 
expression of his opinion on the case or to announce a determination to stand 
for a certain verdict. When one does that at the outset, his sense of pride 
may be aroused, and he may hesitate to recede from an announced position if 
shown that it is fallacious. Remember, that you are not partisans or advocates 
in this matter, but are judges. The fina] test of the quality of your service 
will lie in the verdict which you return to the Court, not in the opinion any 
of you may hold as you retire. Have in mind that you will make a definite 
contribution to efficient judicial administration if you arrive at a just and 
proper verdict. To that end, the Court would remind you that in your 
deliberations in the jury room, there can be no triumph excepting that 
ascertainment and declaration of the truth and the adminstration of justice 
based thereon. 
INSTRUCTION NUMBER 18 
These instructions, though numbered separately, are to be considered 
and construed as one connected whole. Each instruction should be read and 
understood in reference to and as a part of the entire charge and not as 
though any one sentence or instruction separately were intended to state the 
whole law of the case upon any particular point. Moreover, the order in which 
the instructions are given has no significance as to their relative importance. 
INSTRUCTION NUMBER 19 
If you believe any witness has wilfully testified falsely as to any 
material fact in the case, you are at liberty to disregard the whole of the 
testimony of such witness, except as he may have been corroborated by other 
credible witnesses or evidence. You are not bound to believe all that the 
witnesses may have testified to nor are you bound to believe any witness; you 
may believe one witness as against many, or many as against one. 
NO. 20 
TWO RE^ONABIE INTERPRETATIONS 
If the evidence in this case can be interpreted two ways, each of 
which appears to you to be reasonable, and if one interpretation points to the 
guilt of the Defendant, and the other to his innocence, it is your duty to 
adopt the interpretation pointing to innocence, and to render a verdict of 
"not guiltyM. 
NO. ^  
TESTIMONY OF DEFENDANT 
The Defendant is a competent witness in his own behalf and his 
testimony should be given the same consideration as you give to that of any 
other witness, and you may test his credibility or the weight of his testimony 
as you would that of other witnesses as given to you heretofore in these 
instructions. 
The law expressly gives the Defendant the right to remain silent at 
all stages of the proceedings against him including the right not to testify 
on his own behalf at the trial. If the Defendant does not choose to testify, 
you cannot consider this as any evidence of his guilt, nor may you indulge in 
any speculation or presumption adverse to his innocence by reason of his 
choosing not to testify. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 22 
Every person acting with the mental state required for the commission 
of an offense who directly connmits the offense, who solicits, requests, 
commands, encourages, or intentionally aids another person to engage in 
conduct, which constitues an offense shall be criminally liable as a party for 
such conduct. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 23 
I further charge you that in arriving at your verdict, you must not 
consider the punishment which may be imposed upon the Defendant. It is the 
responsibility of the Court to fix the punishment within the limits allowed by 
law, and it is improper for you to consider this in arriving at your verdict 
of guilty or not guilty. 
INSTRUCTION NUMBER 24 
When you retire to deliberate, you should appoint one of your number 
as foreman. Your verdict must be in writing, signed by your foreman and when 
found, must be returned by you into Court. 
Your verdict in this case must be: 
Guilty of Distribution for Value of a Controlled Substance, a Third 
Degree Felony, as charged in the Information, or 
Not guilty, as your deliberations may result. 
This being a criminal case, it requires a unanimous concurrence of all 
the jurors to find a verdict. 
DATED this / y day of March, 19£6, 
LOUIS'G. TERVORT 
ASSOCIATE DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
